Canada Border Services Agency | Agence des services frontaliers du Canada

Security and Professional Standards Directorate (SPSD)
Infrastructure and Information Security Division (IISD)

Threat and Risk Assessment

Rainbow Bridge Pedestrian Processing

5660 Falls Ave., Niagara Falls ON

June 2020

PROTECTED B

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

The Southern Ontario Regional Security Office conducted a Threat and Risk Assessment (TRA) to assess Physical Security risks to the assets at the Rainbow Bridge Pedestrian Walkway (PedWalk). The scope of the TRA was to mitigate identified risks to within the MEDIUM to LOW range. The TRA was conducted in accordance with the RCMP\CSE Harmonized Threat and Risk Assessment Methodology.

The assessment criteria is based on significant incidents that occurred at this facility and stem from information collected from various sources including Security Incident Reports (SIR), and the Significant Reporting Tool (SRT).

The threats levels were determined by assessing the likelihood of the threat event over a 5 year period (1825 days), the gravity of the identified threat event and are categorized as deliberate, accidental and natural. As a result: Deliberate Threats of Assault to Persons, Assault with a Firearm or Weapon, Intentional Property Damage (Vandalism), Thefts of Assets; and Accidental Threats of Unauthorised disclosure of information, Outages-Telecommunications Network (Landline/Cell/Radios) are rated **VERY LOW (1);** Accidental Threats of Outages-Infrastructure, Outages-Physical Protection Systems (Duress Alarm, CCVE) is rated **MEDIUM (3);** and the Accidental Threat of Loss of Sensitive Assets is rated **HIGH (4).**

Assessment of vulnerabilities is based on the adequacy of the Preventive/Detective/Responsive/and Recovery safeguards. The vulnerabilities associated with lack of continuous video monitoring, safeguards on entrance door preventing entry into Pedwalk, BSO sightlines of approaching threats hampered by the combination of the high reflectivity of the glazed/tinted windows and the interior and exterior lighting levels, and location of handicap button on the exterior providing re-entry into Pedwalk after processing, and the reduced awareness regarding the safeguarding of assets were identified during the assessment and are assessed at an overall vulnerability of **MEDIUM (3).**

Recommendations for the PedWalk take into account the necessary security controls\safeguards required to limit the risk exposure to officers, information, assets and operations to a manageable risk level. These include:

- Installation or replacement of the windows and/or window treatment in the officers' direct line of sight, from a standing or sitting position, using 3M's Nightvision 25 or a similar product that provides a clear view to the outside, regardless of the lighting conditions, while protecting the privacy of the interior operation.

- Installation of electronic access control on the PedWalk entrance, with remote operation by a button installed in the Officer's workspace or by the presentation of an access card at an exterior card reader. Free egress must always be maintained in accordance with the applicable building and fire codes.

- Relocation of the power assist door operator, currently on the exterior of the exit into Canada door, to prevent admissible travellers from re-entering the processing area, while allowing it to be opened remotely in the event of an emergency or enforcement activity.

- Provision of on-going awareness to employees for the continued support of the security requirements for safe handling, storage, verification reporting and to further reduce the vulnerability of losses and ensure the ongoing maintenance to the security systems, such as access control and intrusion detection systems.

The full implementation of the recommendations above will lower all risks into an acceptable range of Medium to Low with the highest remaining residual risk being Loss of Assets/Information and Outages-Physical at **Medium**.

All recommendations for Physical Security are based on a thorough evaluation of risk using the CSE/RCMP Harmonized Threat and Risk Assessment methodology. This forms the basis of the standard when determining and recommending specific safeguards to address local challenges, unique design, property layouts and unique threats circumstances at the various sites where CBSA has a port of entry or office.

2. Background

The Rainbow Bridge is owned by the Niagara Falls Bridge Commission (NFBC), a not-for-profit international public authority, joining Niagara Falls, New York to Niagara Falls, Ontario, in the heart of the tourist district.

The PedWalk is separated from the main CBSA building by Canada bound bus lanes and U.S. bound traffic lanes and open 24 hrs. per day, 365 days per year.

The Rainbow Bridge PedWalk conducts admissibility examinations of travellers arriving by foot from Niagara Falls, New York. Statistics for 2017-2018 indicate that over 336,000 travellers entered Canada through this crossing, an increase of 40% over five years. The highest number of crossings was recorded in July 2018 at 61,316 which correlates to an average of approximately 1,978 travellers a day, due primarily to tourists, refugee claimants and 'Flagpolers', those seeking the processing of their Confirmation of Permanent Resident, Work Permit and Study Permit applications.

3. Scope

This Threat and Risk Assessment was conducted under the authority of the Treasury Board Secretariat *Policy on Government Security*, which requires departments and agencies to identify and assess threats to which facilities are exposed, and define requirements for providing reasonable assurance that individuals, information and assets are adequately protected, thereby supporting the delivery of government programs, services and activities.

4. Limitations

- This TRA considered available information , including but not limited to: security incident reports, events reported to the Border Operations Centre, stakeholder and open source information.
- National Threat Levels were used when site specific information was unavailable.
- All threat likelihood was based upon the last 5 years
- Lack of technical specifications for existing window treatment from Section 6 Operator.

5. Asset Identification and Valuation

6. Threat Assessment

6.1 Deliberate Threats

6.2 Accidental Threats

7. Vulnerability Assessment

8. Risk Assessment

9. Recommendations

10. Residual Risk

11 Approvals

Threat and Risk Assessment (TRA) – Approvals		
Signing Authority	**Signature**	**YYYY-MM-DD**
Portfolio Security Manager	CARTMAN LISA Digitally signed by CARTMAN LISA Date: 2020.12.11 09:08:45 -05'00'	
Physical Security Manager	CAMPBELL SCOTT Digitally signed by CAMPBELL SCOTT Date: 2020.12.11 09:01:45 -05'00'	
Director IISD		
Chief Security Officer (CSO)		